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United Structures v. G.R.G. Engineering: Set-off 
v. Recoupment in Miller Act Payment Bond 
Disputes 
Since 1935, the Miller Act1 has served to protect suppliers 
on federal construction projects. The Act provides a statutory 
scheme for payment and performance bonds in connection with 
federal jobs. The performance bond portion of the Miller Act 
protects the federal government by ensuring that money will be 
available should the project remain un~ompleted.~ The pay- 
ment bond provisions on the other hand ensure compensation 
to "any person who has . . . furnished labor or material and 
who has not been paid in full" by a general contractor or sub- 
contra~tor .~ Disputes often arise between general contractors 
and those protected by its payment bond. This note concerns 
the payment bond portion of the Miller Act and the rights re- 
tained by a general contractor supplied with defective materials 
or labor. 
The Miller Act is highly remedial and is subject to a liberal 
interpretation for the protection of those i t   shelter^.^ These as- 
pects of the Act clash with other objectives stated by the Su- 
preme C o ~ r t . ~  Thus, courts must balance general principles 
when faced with an unpaid materialmans in a dispute with a 
general contractor who claims the supplied materials are defec- 
tive. In the realm of counterclaims, for example, the Supreme 
Court wishes "to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve 
1. 40 U.S.C. $$ 270a-270d (1988). Before the Miller Act, the Heard Act of 
1894, ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (codified as amended a t  40 U.S.C. § 270 (1934)), re- 
pealed by Miller Act, ch. 642, 49 Stat. 794 (1935), served the same function by 
"requir[ing] Government contractors to execute penal bonds for the benefit of 'all 
persons supplying him or them with labor and materials in the prosecution of the 
work provided for in such contract.'" Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex 
rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 104 (1944) (citing the Heard Act). 
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
3. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U S .  116, 
118 (1974). 
4. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. a t  107. 
5. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. a t  124 (citing MacEuoy, 322 U.S. a t  107). 
6. Or another sub or sub-subcontrador. See infra notes 24-29 and accom- 
panying text. 
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resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of com- 
mon matters.'" However, "the intent [of the Miller Act] was to 
remove procedural difficulties . . . and thereby make it easier 
for unpaid creditors to realize the benefits of the [payment] 
bond.'" In this manner, the purpose of protecting sheltered 
parties can a t  times oppose the goal of preventing unnecessary 
duplication of actions. Two recent cases, decided in  Federal 
Circuits on opposite sides of the country arrive on opposite 
sides of the issue by giving weight to different stated objec- 
t i v e ~ . ~  This note will consider both sides of the issue, ultimate- 
ly siding with those who would give the Miller Act its full re- 
medial powers despite other stated goals of streamlined litiga- 
tion. 
A. The Miller Act 
The Miller Act1' was enacted in 1935 as a replacement for 
the Heard Act of 1894." It requires contractors to furnish 
both a performance and a payment bond12 to the federal gov- 
ernment13 "[blefore any contract, exceeding $25,000 in  
amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public 
building o r  public work of the United States"14 is awarded. 
The purpose of the performance bond is to protect the United 
States Government by ensuring that the work is completed.15 
7. Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962). 
8. MacEvoy, 322 U.S. at  106 (discussing the Miller Act's intent to improve 
upon the Heard Act). 
9. See United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996 (1st 
Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Construc- 
tors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1984). 
lo. 40 U.S.C. 9s 270a-270d. 
11. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. at  105; H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., a t  
1 (1935). The Heard Act is found at Ch. 280, 28 Stat. 278 (codified as amended at  
40 U.S.C. § 270 (1934)), repealed by Miller Act, Ch. 642, 49 Stat. 794 (1935). 
12. This represents an improvement on the Heard Act, which required the 
general contractor to post "but one bond . . . which serve[d] as protection both for 
the United States and for subcontractors, material men, and laborers." H.R. REP. 
NO. 1263, at 2 (1935). "If suit [was] brought by the United States on the bond, 
other claimants may [have] intervene[d] and ha(d] their claims adjudicated, subject 
t o  the priority of the United States." Id. 
13. Note that under the Miller Act, "[t]ypically, the performance bond and the 
payment bond are two separate instruments." ROBERT RUBIN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION 
CLAIMS PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 129 (1992). 
14. 40 U.S.C. 9 270a. 
15. United States a rel. Warren v. Kimrey, 489 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1974) 
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The payment bond, on the other hand, "protect[s] those who 
furnish labor and material to prime  contractor^."'^ For exam- 
ple, in the case of an insolvent general contractor, the govern- 
ment could collect on the performance bond, thus "ensur[ing] 
that [it] will receive a completed project a t  the price set forth in 
the underlying contract."17 Likewise, under the payment bond, 
those serving the general contractor could sue for recom- 
pense.'' 
As mentioned above, this note concerns the payment rather 
than the performance bond portion of the Act. The language of 
the Miller Act's payment bond provisions protects suppliers to 
government contractsl%ho furnish "labor or material in the 
prosecution of the work [and] who ha[ve] not been paid in 
full . . . sums justly due [them].'"' Because state-based 
mechanics' liens cannot attach to government property,21 
these suppliers are "deprived of their usual security interest," 
absent the protection of the Act.= Despite an avowedly liberal 
interpretation on the part of the federal the Act's 
remedies are limited to those who have a contractual agree- 
ment with either the general contractor or a subc~ntractor .~~ 
Thus, Congress has mandated that "[a] sub-subcontractor may 
avail himself of the protection of the bond . . . but that is as far 
as the bill goes. It is not felt that more remote relationships 
ought to come within the purview of the bond."25 
The United States Supreme Court has defined a subcon- 
tractor as "one who contracts with a prime c~ntractor ."~~ Only 
-- 
("[Tlhe performance bond . . . under the terms of [40 U.S.C.] 8 270a is for the 
protection of the United States."); Vardaman S. DUM, Construction Contract 
Claims and Litigation-Suits on Public Bonds and Suits on Private Bonds, 55 
MISS. L.J. 431, 437 (1985). 
16. 17 AM. JLJR. 2D Contractor's Bonds 5 150 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
17. Anthony N. Palladino & Anna P. Clarke, The Recognition of Sureties' 
Rights Under Government Contracts, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 637, 645 (1990). 
18. Id. 
19. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 
U.S. 102, 107 (1944). 
20. 40 U.S.C. 8 270b(a) (1988). 
21. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947) (citations 
omitted); F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 122 (1973). 
22. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. a t  122. 
23. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text. 
24. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex re1 Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 
US.  102, 107-08 (1944). 
25. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess., a t  2 (1935). 
26. J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586, 
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those in privity with a contractor or subcontractor are afforded 
the protection of the Miller ~ c t . ~ '  Employees or those supply- 
ing materials to sub-subcontractors cannot take advantage of 
it.28 This result is contrary to the plain language of the Act, 
which protects "[elvery person who has furnished labor or mate- 
rial in  prosecution of the The Court apparently as- 
sumed "that Congress did not intend to impose such a burden 
without explicit language being used to this effect."30 This 
preference for bright line tests in  Miller Act disputes was em- 
braced by the Ninth Circuit in  United States u. Avanti Con- 
structors, Inc. 31 
B. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. 
Avanti Constructors, Inc. 
In  United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. u. 
Auanti Constructors, Inc.," the Ninth Circuit dealt with the  
issue of whether a general contractor has the right of set-off 
against a supplier in a Miller Act payment bond dispute.33 
Specifically, Avanti concerned a supplier not in privity with the  
general contractor." There, Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. 
("Martin") supplied steel to Harvis Construction, Inc. ("Harvis") 
and  subsequently sued Harvis on its Miller Act Payment Bond 
for monies allegedly due.35 Avanti Constructors, Inc. 
("Avanti") was a subcontractor of Harvis with whom Martin 
had c o n t r a ~ t e d . ~ ~  As a defense to Martin's action, Harvis con- 
594 (1978). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 593. This line drawing inspired a fierce dissent from Justice 
Stevens, who was joined by Justice Brennan. They felt that the legislative intent of 
the Heard Act, as gleaned from the floor debates, mandated a liberal interpretation 
such that "the . . . Act cover[] 'all persons supplying [a  contractor or contractors] 
labor and materials in the prosecution of the work . . . .'" Id. at  596 (quoting ch. 
280, 28 Stat. 278 (as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 270 (1926))). 
29. 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (emphasis added). 
30. DUM, supra note 15, at 443 (footnote omitted). "The reason[] relates to 
the practical difficulty that would be encountered by the prime contractor in pro- 
tecting himself against claims of remote material suppliers with whom he has no 
contractual relationship." Id. at 442-43. 
31. 750 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1984). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 762. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 760. 
36. Avanti went bankrupt in May of 1982 and was subsequently dismissed as 
a party to the suit. Id. 
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tended that  it was entitled to a set-off because Martin's steel 
was "late and defe~t ive ."~~ 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that  "a 
set-off defense is not available in a Miller Act claim in the 
absence of p r i ~ i t y . " ~ ~  It reasoned that  a set-off defense would 
"unduly burden the enforcement of the rights created under the 
act."3g Further, the court concluded that  any claims Harvis 
had for the defective steel were against Avanti, not Martin.40 
The court justified this by reasoning that  "the prime contractor 
selects his own subcontractors and it seems not unjustly harsh 
that  he should be holden for their laxities.'"' Finally, the 
court cited several cases4"o support its assertion that  the 
right of set-off is allowed only where "the plaintiff is a subcon- 
tractor or materialman of the general contractor and thus is in 
direct contractual relations with the c~unterc la imant ."~~ 
By allowing Avanti, a sub-subcontractor, to categorically 
recover on the bond, the court gave effect to the general aim of 
the Miller Act: "[Tlo protect those whose labor or material has 
contributed to the prosecution of the Nine years later, 
the issue was revisited in  United Structures of America v. 
G.R. G. Engineering, S . E . ~ ~  There, under similar facts, another 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on the opposite side of the 
country came to a contrary conclusion. 
37. Id. at 762. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 763. 
41. Id. (quoting Glassel-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527, 
530-31 (5th Cir. 1946)). 
42. United States ex rd. Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781, 790 (2d 
Cir. 1938); United States ex rel. Kashulines v. Thermo Contracting Corp., 437 F. 
Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1976); United States ex reJ. Arlmont Air Condition Corp. v. Pre- 
mier Contractors, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (N.D. Me. 1968). 
43. Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762. 
44. United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 204 (1906); 
see also DUM, supra note 15, at 437-38 (''[Tlhe Act is highly remedial and entitled 
to liberal construction and application in order properly to effectuate the congres- 
sional intent to protect suppliers of labor and materials for public projects." 
(footnote omitted)). 
45. 9 F.3d 996 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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111. UNITED STRUCTURES OF AMERICA V. G.R.G. 
ENGINEERING, S.E. 
A. The Facts 
In United Structures of America u. G.R.G. Engineering, 
S.E.,46 the First Circuit dealt with a fact pattern similar to 
that  in Avanti. G.R.G. Engineering ("G.R.G.") was the general 
contractor on two projects: one for the United States Govern- 
ment and one for the Puerto Rican G~vernment.~' Regarding 
the United States Government project, G.R.G. was required to 
furnish a payment bond pursuant to the Miller Act "'for the 
protection of all persons supplying labor and material' to the 
(that is, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors)? 
United Structures of America ("United Structures") supplied 
steel to one of G.R.G.'s  subcontractor^.^^ After failing to pay 
United Structures in full, the subcontractor went bankruptO5' 
United Structures then brought suit against G.R.G. to recover 
approximately $282,000 allegedly still due under the con- 
t r a c t ~ . ~ ~  
G.R.G. countered that the supplied steel was defective, and 
that  it was therefore entitled to a set-off in  the amount of 
$196,509 on the monies owed.53 The district court cited Avanti 
for the proposition that  "a set-off defense is not available in a 
Miller Act claim in the absence of p r i ~ i t y , " ~ ~  thus denying 
G.R.G. relief on its defective steel claim.55 On appeal, howev- 
er, the First Circuit took exception to Auanti, holding that 
G.R.G. was attempting to assert a right of "recoupment" rather 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 997. 
48. Id. (citing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. $ 270a(a)(2)). 
49. J.W. Bateson Co. v. Board of Trustees of the Natl Automatic Sprinkler 
Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 593 (1978). 
50. United Structures, 9 F.3d at  997. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. G.R.G. also alleged that it owed nothing to United Structures because 
"United [Structures] engaged in a fraudulent billing practice known as 'front 
loading'." Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against G.R.G., finding no 
genuine or material issues of fact in dispute as to that claim. Id. at  1000. 
54. United States v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
55. United Structures, 9 F.3d at  997 (citing Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762). 
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than one of set-off under the contract.56 This distinction, the 
court held, made any determination of privity i r r e l e~an t .~~  
B. The First Circuit's Reasoning 
In allowing G.R.G. to assert a recoupment defense, the 
First Circuit drew a distinction between the doctrines of re- 
coupment and set-~ff.~' It held that a set-off is a counterclaim 
which arises out of an unrelated transaction, while recoupment 
is a reduction by a defendant of a plaintiff's claim because of a 
right arising out of the same transa~tion.~~ The court cited 
Black's Law Dictionary to distinguish the two ideas: 
If Smith sues Jones for $10,000 for grain that Smith supplied, 
and Jones seeks to  reduce the judgment by $5,000 represent- 
ing Smith's (unrelated) unpaid rental of Jones' summer cot- 
tage, Jones is seeking a setoff. "Recoupment," on the other 
hand, is "a reduction or rebate by the defendant of part of the 
plaintiff's claim because of a right in the defendant arising 
out of the same transaction." If Smith sues Jones for $10,000 
for grain that Smith supplied, and Jones seeks to reduce the 
judgment by $5,000 representing Jones' expenditure to dry 
out Smith's (defectively) wet grain (or the cost of the grain's 
lost value), Jones is seeking a r e ~ o u ~ m e n t . ~ ~  
Although the court admitted that the distinction is "somewhat 
te~hnical,"~' it noted that it remains alive in a few specialized 
circumstances, one of which is the realm of bankr~ptcy.~' 
The First Circuit gave two reasons for allowing G.R.G. the 
benefit of the distinction under the Miller It first inter- 
preted the language of the Act to allow "a supplier to recover, 
56. Id. at 998-99. 
57. Id. at  999-1000. 
58. Id. at 998. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting BLACK'S U W  DICTIONARY 
1230 (5th ed. 1979)). 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; see, e-g., Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984); Sapir v. 
Blue CrossA3lue Shield (In la Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc.), 34 B.R. 385, 
386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Mid- 
west Serv. and Supply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265 (D. Utah 1983); Waldschmidt v. 
C.B.S., Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 
41  B.R. 122, 125 n.5 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984). However, i t  has by all means not been 
limited to bankruptcy cases. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 
U.S. 296, 299 (1946) (federal income tax dispute). 
63. United Structures, 9 F.3d at  999-1000. 
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not the full contract price, but the 'sums justly due him."'64 
The court then reasoned that recoupment, as a mechanism for 
'"do[ing] justice in view of the one transaction as a whole,' 
would seem to match the statute's  requirement[^]."^^ Further, 
it held that "we do not see how the full contract price of goods 
supplied can possibly be 'justly due' a person who supplied 
defective goods.'"" 
The second reason the court gave for allowing the recoup- 
ment defense stems from "the policies underlying the Miller 
Act."" Although the Supreme Court has regularly held that 
the purpose of the Miller Act is t o  '"protect those whose labor 
or material has contributed t o  the prosecution of the 
the First Circuit decided not t o  extend this protection t o  "in- 
clude payments to which the supplier's underlying contract 
does not entitle him."" The court pointed to the fact that 
those who are in privity with a general contractor (such as a 
subcontractor) may be subject to a reduction for "defective arti- 
cles or work."70 Because the "defective articles or work" may 
have been supplied by one not in privity with the general con- 
tractor (such as a supplier t o  the subcontractor)," the court 
reasoned that those who are not in privity with the general 
contractor (e.g., the sub-subcontractors and suppliers to the 
subcontractors) should be held to the same ~tandard.~' In 
sum, the First Circuit felt that "disallowing recoupment would 
give the supplier 'rights' to which his contract does not entitle 
him."73 
64. Id. at 999 (emphasis added) (quoting the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 9 270b(a)). 
65. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rothensies, 329 U.S. at  299). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 
U.S. 102, 104 (1944) (quoting United States ex rd. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 
U.S. 197, 204 (1906) (construing the Heard Act)); see also J.W. Bateson Co. v. 
United States ex rd. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586, 596 n.2 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 124 (1974). 
69. United Structures, 9 F.3d at  999. 
70. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN C. MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS 9 49.490[4], at  49-658 (1993)). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1000. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The result reached by the First Circuit in United Struc- 
tures represents a clash of two general governmental policies: 
that of the courts in attempting to expeditiously consolidate 
causes of action,74 and that of Congress in attempting to pro- 
tect those that supply labor and materials on federal pro- 
j e c t ~ . ? ~  This note will examine these policies in order to deter- 
mine first whether recoupment is proper in the absence of 
contractual privity, and second whether the First Circuit's 
reasoning in United Structures can be defended in light of the 
stated purposes and highly remedial nature of the Miller Act. 
Finally this note will examine the traditionally low burden of 
proof placed on those who supply labor and materials and how 
that burden relates to the result the First Circuit reached in  
United Structures. 
A. Recoupment is Improper in the Absence of Privity 
The First Circuit was concerned primarily with the pay- 
ment bond portion of the Miller Act as a method by which a 
supplier could collect "sums justly due him."76 In reasoning 
that "disallowing recoupment would . . . give the supplier 
'rights' to which his contract does not entitle him,"77 the Unit- 
ed Structures court mentioned that it  did not "understand why 
the existence or nonexistence of privity of contract should make 
any difference with regard to [the] general policies [of the Mill- 
er  Ac~]."'~ However, privity has nothing to do with giving the 
supplier supplementary rights in a contract-the more sensible 
question is whether recoupment is proper in the absence of 
privity in  a Miller Act dispute. 
As mentioned above, recoupment is a defense based upon a 
debt arising out of the same transaction while set-off does not 
necessarily involve a claim arising out of the same transaction 
or ~ontract.~' In United Structures, the court assumed that it  
74. Montecatini Edison, S.P.A. v. Ziegler, 486 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
75. H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935). 
76. United Structures, 9 F.3d at 999 (quoting 40 U.S.C. 4 270b(a)). 
77. Id. at 1000. 
78. Id. at 999. 
79. Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (1984); 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Coun- 
terclaim $5 34 & 35 (1953); see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
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was dealing with a single transa~tion.'~ In fact, there were 
several. United Structures supplied its steel t o  a subcontrac- 
tor." The subcontractor in turn used the steel in G.R.G.'s pro- 
j e ~ t . ' ~  When United Structures was not paid, it brought suit 
against G.R.G. under the provisions of the Miller Act.83 
Thus, the situation looked less like the example borrowed 
from Black's Law Dictionary by the United Structures courts4 
and more like the following: Smith supplies grain to Beck who 
makes it into bread. The bread is in turn sold to Jones. Smith 
sues Jones for $10,000 for grain that Smith supplied to Beck 
under an exclusive statutory remedy created expressly for the 
protection of people in Smith's position. Jones seeks to reduce 
the judgment by $5,000 representing Jones' loss from the alleg- 
edly defective grain. In this example there was not one transac- 
tion, but several. Recall that recoupment is a defense arising 
out of the same transaction that gave rise to the initial claim. 
The United Structures situation appears to involve multi- 
ple transactions despite a liberal definition of the term "trans- 
action" by the In the realm of counterclaims, the Su- 
preme Court holds that "'[t]ransaction' is a word of flexible 
meaning" which "may comprehend a series of many occurrenc- 
es, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their 
connection as upon their logical relation~hip."~~ The theory 
behind this holding is judicial e~pediency.'~ Other courts have 
followed the Supreme Court's lead in interpreting "transaction" 
br~adly:~' "This concept . . . is not affected by the fact that the 
80. See IJnited St~uctures, 9 F.3d at 998-1000. 
81. Id. at  997. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
85. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926). 
86. Id. at  610. The United Structures court followed the Avanti court in 
characterizing the attempted set-off by G.R.G. as a defense. However, the Supreme 
Court notes: "'[Ilt is not clear whether set-offs and recoupments should be viewed 
as defenses or counterclaims . . . .'" Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (1993) 
(quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE $ 1275 (2d ed. 1990)). 
87. See, e.g., Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 625 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe term 'transaction' is to be construed generously to avoid 
the unnecessary expense inherent in multiplicious litigation.") (footnote omitted). 
88. May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer and Storage, Inc., 899 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 
(10th Cir. 1990) (dealing with claim preclusion and noting that a "'contract' is 
generally considered to be a 'transaction,'"); Columbia Plaza Corp. 525 F.2d a t  625; 
FSLIC v. Burdette, 696 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D. Tern. 1988). 
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case happens to fall under the Miller Act."89 The question re- 
mains, however, whether the once-removed relationship be- 
tween G.R.G. and United Structures should be viewed in this 
broad manner. 
Several factors mitigate against concluding G.R.G.'s re- 
coupment arose out of a single transaction. First, the Supreme 
Court's liberal interpretation of the word has generally been 
applied to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which deals 
with compulsory counter~lairns.~~ Recoupment is a n  equitable 
doctrineg1 and should be applied in a manner which would 
reinforce the broad remedial policies of the statutory scheme 
under which relief is For example, recoupment is 
held inapplicable when it clashes with a legislatively enacted 
statute of  limitation^.^^ Likewise, i t  was improper for the 
First Circuit to apply recoupment against United Structures 
when the legislature specifically enacted the payment bond 
provisions of the Miller Act to protect those in United 
Structure's p~sition. '~ 
Second, "transaction" is not always defined quite as broad- 
ly as first mentioned." Many courts which recognize recoup- 
ment require that the amounts sought to be recouped arise out 
of the same "contract" rather than " t ransact i~n."~~ In fact, just 
89. United States ex re,!. Cent. Rigging & Contracting Corp. v. Paul Tishman 
Co., 32 F.R.D. 223, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (citations omitted) (dealing with whether a 
"[c]ourt has ancillary jurisdiction over a counterclaim or cross-claim arising out of 
the same transactionn). 
90. Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962). 
91. Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 159 
(10th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy case). 
92. I t  must be noted, however, that the equitable nature of recoupment cuts 
both ways. An equally compelling argument is raised by the United Structures 
court: "[D]isallowing recoupment would . . . give the supplier 'rights' to which his 
contract does not entitle him." United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 
9 F.3d 996, 1000 (1st Cir. 1993). 
93. "If there are to be exceptions to the statute of limitations, it is for Con- 
gress rather than for the courts to create and limit them." Rothensies v. Electric 
Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946) (declining to apply recoupment in 
the realm of tax law); see id. (stating "[tlhat claims dead so long can be resurrect- 
ed under [recoupment], is enough to show its menace to the statute of limita- 
tions"); id. at  302, (noting that "if we should approve a doctrine of recoupment of 
the breadth here applied we would seriously undermine the statute of limitations"). 
94. In a similar situation, the court in Manchester Premium Budget Corp. v. 
Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 612 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Ohio 
law), held that "mutuality of parties [is] 'an essential condition of a valid set-off or 
counterclaim. That is, the debts must be to and from the same persons and in the 
same capacity.' " 
95. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
96. Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (10th Cir. 
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because "'the same two parties are involved [in the claims to be 
offset], and that a similar subject matter gave rise to both 
claims . . . does not mean that the two arose from the 'same 
transaction' for purposes of the doctrine of rec~upment."~ 
Further, "courts have generally only found this 'same 
transaction' requirement to be satisfied when the debts to be 
offset arise out of a single, integrated contract or similar trans- 
action."98 If we use a single contract analysis, then clearly re- 
coupment was improper in United  structure^.^^ The relation- 
ship between United Structures and G.R.G. was once removed. 
United Structures contracted only with the subcontractor, 
which in turn contracted with G.R.G.loO Because contractual 
privity was lacking in United Structures, there was not a single 
transa~tion.'~' Recoupment was therefore improperly applied. 
Further, in Avanti, the Ninth Circuit was correct in noting 
that the prime contractor "[is] in the best position to protect 
1990) (per curiam); see also Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B&L Oil Co.), 
782 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (assertion by the creditor that "claims arising 
from a single contract generally qualify for recoupment"); Lee v. Schweiker, 739 
F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984) ("In bankruptcy, the recoupment doctrine has been 
applied primarily where the debtor's claims against the creditor arise out of the 
same contract.") (citations omitted). 
But see Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1934) ("[Rlecoupment is in 
the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which 
the plaintiff's action is grounded."); Holford v. Powers, 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 
1990); In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944); Sapir v. 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium), 34 B.R. 385, 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Midwest 
Serv. and Supply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265-66 (D. Utah 1983); Waldschmidt v. C.B.S., 
Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 41 B.R. 
122, 125-26 n.5 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984); 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim 34 
(1953) ("In recoupment defendant's claim must arise out of the same contract or 
transaction as that on which plaintiff's cause of action is founded."). 
97. In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1538 (.loth Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
(quoting Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also FDIC v. 
Howse, 802 F. Supp 1554, 1563 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (citing In re Davidouich, 901 F.2d 
at  1538). 
98. In re Dauidovich, 901 F.2d at 1538 (citations omitted); see also Rothensies 
v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946) (in the realm of tax law, 
criticizing a lower court that "saw no reason for narrowly construing the require- 
ment [of recoupment] that both claims originate in the same transaction," and 
opining that "this [analysis] misapprehends the limitations on the doctrine of re- 
coupment"). 
99. In the Davidovich case, recoupment was held inapplicable where the obli- 
gations of the parties "did not arise out of the same contract, [and were] not limit- 
ed to the same parties . . . ." 901 F.2d at  1538. 
100. United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997 (1st 
Cir. 1993). 
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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itself against [the subcontractor's] potential bankr~ptcy." '~~ 
When examined objectively, it is really the subcontractor that 
supplied the steel to the general contractor (G.R.G.). I t  is only 
through the Miller Act that the general contractor and the sub- 
subcontractor (United structures) have any relationship. 
Among other things, the relationship was created for the bene- 
fit of the sub-subcontra~tor.'~~ Allowing G.R.G. to also benefit 
from that relationship is contrary to legislative intent. 
Finally, in both Avanti and United Structures, the general 
contractor was attempting to set-off or recoup sums due a sub- 
subcontra~tor. '~~ These situations are analogous. If, as a gen- 
eral proposition, privity is required for a set-off,lo5 i t  should 
be doubly required for the more restrictive defense of recoup- 
ment.lo6 If the First Circuit wished to disagree with the 
Avanti court on this point it should have done so. Instead, it 
found its way around that decision, further complicating this 
area of law.lo7 
In sum, despite the First Circuit's arguments to the con- 
trary,lo8 contractual privity matters very much in a defense of 
recoupment. To be a part of the same transaction, the party 
attempting to assert a defense of recoupment cannot, in the 
absence of privity, base that defense on the Miller Act1'' Al- 
though these arguments may seem like splitting hairs, the 
remedial nature of the Miller Act mandates that they be split 
in favor of those it was enacted to protect. 
102. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Construc- 
tors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1984). 
103. H.R. REP. NO. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1935); S. REP. NO. 1238, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1935). 
104. See United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997 
(1st Cir. 1993); United States PX rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Steel 
Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1984). 
105. Avanti, 750 F.2d at 762. 
106. See generally 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim $9 34 & 35 (1953) (same 
transaction required for recoupment but not for set-off). 
107. United Structures, 9 F.3d at 1000 (allowing recoupment in the absence of 
privity, but not specifically ruling on set-off). 
108. Id. at 1000-01. 
109. For a contrary view, see United States ex rel. Kashulines v. Thermo Con- 
trading Corp., 437 F. Supp. 195, 199-200 (D.N.J. 1976), arguing that permissive 
counterclaims such as set-off (and possibly recoupment) may be asserted under par- 
ticular causes of action such as the Miller Act. Even this case, however, did not 
rule out the possibility that an exclusive statutory remedy could overcome a 
defendant's rights to a permissive counterclaim. Id. at 200 ("[Pllaintiff . . . bears a 
heavy burden in seeking to establish that jurisdiction over the permissive counter- 
claims should not exist . . . . Plaintiff has been unable to carry this burden."). 
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B. The Miller Act is Highly Remedial in Nature 
When the intent of the Miller Act is viewed with the Su- 
preme Court's liberal interpretation and application of it, along 
with the Court's wishes that the Act be applied uniformly, the 
flaws in the First Circuit's reasoning are apparent. Despite the 
court's gloss over legislative intent, the fact remains that the 
Miller Act was designed specifically to protect those in United 
Structures' situation. 
"The Miller Act . . . is highly remedial in nature. . . . [and] 
is entitled to a liberal construction and application in order 
properly to effectuate the Congressional intent to protect those 
whose labor and materials go into public  project^.""^ With 
these words, the Supreme Court reiterated the purpose of the 
Act under which United Structures sought relief. The First 
Circuit disregarded legislative intent and instead resurrected 
the doctrine of recoupment"' in order to reach what it appar- 
ently believed to be an equitable result. The Act, however, has 
a long history of single-minded purpose in protecting those who 
supply work and materials on federal jobs.l12 
In  MacEvoy v. United States, the Supreme Court reiterated 
the intent of the legislature "was to remove the procedural 
difficulties found to exist under the earlier measure [the Heard 
Act] and thereby make it easier for unpaid creditors to realize 
the benefits of the bond."'l3 With this intent in mind, it  is ob- 
vious that any analysis denying the fruits of the bond from 
those it was enacted to protect is untenable. This is not to say 
that the general contractor should have no rec~urse."~ On 
110. Clifford I?. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 
US. 102, 107 (1944) (citations omitted). 
111. United Structures, 9 F.3d at  998 (stating that "the distinctions between 
. . . recoupment and set-off are no longer of much importance." (quoting 20 AM. 
JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment and Setoff 4 10 (1965))). But see id. at  1000 
('We have examined the legislative history of the Miller Act . . . but we have 
found nothing that suggests the conclusion reached in Auanti."). 
112. In fact, its history reaches back to the original Heard Act of 1894. See, 
e.g., Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917) (a sub-subcon- 
tractor may sue on the bond despite the subcontractor having already been paid in 
full). 
113. MacEuoy, 322 U.S. at  106. 
114. In comparison to the laborers and material suppliers who normally 
have no lien or claim against the government, usually have no right to 
assert a claim against money withheld by the government on the prime 
contract, and are not entitled to recover on the performance bond execut- 
ed by the prime contractor to the federal government on the theory that 
they are third-party beneficiaries. 
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the contrary, many avenues are open to one in G.R.G.'s posi- 
tion.l15 Recoupment, however, should not be one of them. In 
the absence of privity, the First Circuit simply applied the 
doctrine improperly. 
Another flaw in United Structures is that the Miller Act 
should not be subject to technical rules which work to deny the 
benefits of the payment bond. The rule is simple: "[Tlhe strict 
letter of the Act must yield to its evident spirit and purpose 
when this is necessary to give effect to the intent of Con- 
gre~s.""~ This idea is not new.ll7 Early in this century it 
was applied to a Heard Act dispute in Illinois Surety Co. v. 
John Davis Co? There the Court found that "[iln every case 
which has come before this court, where labor and materials 
were actually furnished for and used in part performance of the 
work contemplated in the bond, recovery was allo~ed.""~ 
That case further held that "[t]echnical rules protecting sure- 
ties from liability have never been applied in proceedings under 
this statute."120 
This cuts against the First Circuit's reasoning in two ways. 
First, the First Circuit admitted the technical nature of the 
recoupment but employed it anyway. "This technical legal ter- 
minology [recoupment] does not necessarily reflect ordinary 
usage."121 Second, the United Structures court made much of 
17 AM. JUR. 2D Contractor's B o d  $ 150 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Their "only 
effective remedy" is the Miller Act payment bond. Id. 
115. Perhaps a suit against the subcontractor would have been more proper. 
See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. On the other hand, under the 
United Structures fact pattern, the subcontractor to whom United Structures sup- 
plied the steel had gone bankrupt. United Structures of America v. G.R.G. Eng'g, 
S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1993). This, however, is the price we pay for bank- 
ruptcy laws which provide overextended debtors a fresh start. See Kansas State 
and Trust Bank v. Vickers (In re Vickers), 577 F.2d 683, 686-87) ("One of the 
primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is the rehabilitation of an honest debtor 
by discharging his debts to afford him a fresh start in his economic life.") (citations 
omitted). The Miller Act's broad remedial scheme should not be implicated. See 
supra notes 112-14. 
116. Glassell-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 153 F.2d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 
1946) (citations omitted). 
117. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) 
("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its 
makers."). 
118. 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. (footnote omitted). 
121. United Structures v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1993) 
("[Olften the technical legal distinction [between set-off and recoupment] does not 
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the fact that the Act only allows recovery for "sums 'justly due' 
a supplier."'" This is a clear case of allowing the letter of the 
law to  prevail over its r e a ~ 0 n . l ~ ~  One can imagine a team of 
clerks scrutinizing the statute until finding two words which 
seem to back the court's preferred holding. The First Circuit's 
opinion is flawed because it fusses over technicalities and ig- 
nores legislative intent. 
A final policy argument against the holding in United 
Structures is the need for consistency in construing the Miller 
Act. "[Tlhe Act covers most federal works  project^,"'^^ no mat- 
ter the state or jurisdiction. The Supreme Court extols the vir- 
tues of uniformity in this area.125 A federal cause of action 
demands the uniformity commensurate with its universal ap- 
plication. While the Avanti court had all but settled the ques- 
tions in this area, the First Circuit unnecessarily muddied the 
waters by allowing the recoupment defense. In sum, the gener- 
al purposes of the Miller Act as defined by both the 74th Con- 
gress and the Supreme Court compel a result contrary to  that 
reached by the First Circuit in United Structures v.  G.R.G. 
Engineering. 12" 
C. The Good Faith Standard and its Relation to Defenses 
Asserted by General Contractors 
Even failing the above mentioned arguments, the First 
Circuit in United Structures should have recognized the almost 
ridiculously low burden of proof to which suppliers caught in 
Miller Act disputes have traditionally been held. In order to 
recover, 
material supplier[s] need only prove four elements: 
(1) the materials were supplied in prosecution of the work 
provided for in the contract; 
matter."). 
122. Id. at 999. 
123. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892) 
("'The reason of the law . . . should prevail over its letter.'" (quoting United States 
v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487 (1868))). 
124. IRV RICHTER & ROY S. MITCHEU, HANDBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION LAW AND 
CLAIMS 209 (1982). 
125. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 
116, 127 (1974) (disallowing the award of attorneys' fees to supplier suing under 
the Miller Act as a matter of uniform application despite probable contrary result 
under state law). 
126. 9 F.3d 996 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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(2) [the supplier] has not been paid; 
(3) [the supplier] had a good faith belief that the materials 
were intended for the specified work; and 
(4) the jurisdictional requisites were met.127 
Concerning the third prong of the test, material suppliers need 
not show that materials were "incorporated into the contract 
Nor do they need to prove "that the materials were 
delivered to the j~bsi te ." '~~ In fact, "in order to be covered by 
the bond, [materials] need . . . [only t o  have been] intended in 
good faith, and reasonably believed [to have been] furnished for 
[the] purpose" of being used in the federal job.lsO 
This points to a good faith standard on the part of materi- 
almen such as United Structures. By analogy, if a supplier 
need only show that the materials were furnished in good faith, 
then likewise the good faith burden should extend to the quali- 
ty of the materials. Although beyond the scope of this note, 
should the First Circuit's recoupment ideas be adopted, it is 
logical that one asserting the defense of recoupment should be 
required to prove that the defective materials were not sup- 
plied in good faith. This would place the burden of proof on the 
general contractor and would standardize claims of those sup- 
plying materials on federal projects who have gone unpaid. 
I t  is important to  remember that the Miller Act was treat- 
ed to protect laborers and materialmen, not general contrac- 
tors.131 General contractors' claims lie either with those to 
which they are in privity or outside of Miller Act disputes alto- 
gether. Neither set-off nor recoupment is proper in the absence 
of privity. Further, the general contractor is in a position to 
protect itself. However, those supplying goods and materials in 
federal jobs have no recourse other than that provided by the 
Miller Act. The remedial scheme should therefore not be whit- 
127. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors v. Avanti Constructors, 
Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States ex re!. Carlson v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 414 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1959)). 
128. 17 AM. JIJH. 2D Contractor's Bonds $ 159 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
129. Id. 
130. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, What Constitutes Supplying Labor and Material 
"in the Prosecution of the Work" Provided for in the Primary Contract Under Miller 
Act, 79 A.L.R.~D 843, 847 (1961) (citation omitted). 
131. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 
U.S. 102, 107 (1944). 
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tled away. Also, Congress never intended the First Circuit's 
narrow reading. The two words, "justly due," distilled out of 
many, cannot overcome the Miller Act's broad remedial nature. 
Although the Supreme Court encourages judicial expediency, it 
also recognizes the value of the protections afforded by the 
Miller Act. Justice requires that equity not rule in favor of 
technicalities over fairness. Lastly, the customary interpreta- 
tion of the Miller Act, and the burden of proof those it protects 
have traditionally been held to, scream against any weakening 
of its remedial scheme. Although recoupment is a useful tool, 
the First Circuit in United Structures simply applied it improp- 
erly. Courts would be wise not to follow the First Circuit in its 
application of recoupment. Such limitations have no place in 
Miller Act payment bond disputes. 
Dennis M. Sponer 
